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The emergence of the idea of race as a scientifi c category in the fi rst 
half of the nineteenth century in the United States was simultaneous 
with the emergence of biology as a category of knowledge and scien-
tifi c racism as a mode of justifying both the enslavement of African 
Americans and the genocide of American Indians.1 This racial bio-logic 
formed a new discourse of identity in the West, which claimed an au-
tonomous and original realm of analysis for itself, though we can read 
it today as a particular form of cultural logic. This emergent bio-logic, 
however ambiguously, enters the discourse of federal Indian law in the 
landmark case of U.S. v. Rogers in 1846.
The Lumbee legal scholar David E. Wilkins gives us this summary of 
the facts of the case:
[William S.] Rogers, a yeoman, got into a deadly scuffl e in 
September 1844 with Jacob Nicholson, who, like Rogers, 
was Euro-American by race, had married into the Cherokee 
Nation, and was, by Cherokee law, a citizen of their nation. 
Rogers killed Nicholson by stabbing him in the side with a fi ve-
dollar knife. Rogers was arrested, then indicted by the grand 
jury in the district court of Arkansas in April 1845. When he 
was brought into federal court to hear the indictment, Rogers, 
representing himself, argued that the district court lacked ju-
risdiction to try him because both he and the deceased were 
regarded legally as Indians by the Cherokee Nation and under 
 * This essay is excerpted from “The (Post)Colonial Construction of Indian Country: 
U.S. American Indian Literatures and Federal Indian Law,” which is Part I of 
the Columbia Guide to American Indian Literatures of the United States since 1945 
(forthcoming in 2006 from Columbia UP). Research for this essay was enabled 
by a fellowship from the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University, and 
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the 1834 trade and intercourse act the United States lacked ju-
risdiction in such cases [of Indian on Indian crime]. (39)
The case came to the Supreme Court in 1846 “on a certifi cate of di-
vision” (45 U.S. at 567), the two circuit court judges not being able to 
decide the matter (ironically, as Wilkins points out, when the case did 
reach the Supreme Court, Rogers, unbeknownst to the Court, had died 
by drowning during a prison break [40]). Somewhat contrary to Wilkins’ 
summary, Rogers, in his plea, did not assert that “he and the deceased 
were regarded legally as Indians by the Cherokee Nation” but that he and 
Nicholson were Cherokee Indians (45 U.S. at 568; my emphasis). This 
may seem to put too fi ne a point on the matter but I think not. For what 
Rogers’ identifi cation of himself as a “Cherokee Indian” suggests is an im-
portant tension between the cultural-political identity: Cherokee and what 
was at this moment emerging as the racial designation Indian. That is, the 
identity of “Cherokee Indian” articulates a coupling of cultural logic with 
a bio-logic. A longer quote from Rogers’ plea can help us understand this 
coupling, which represents the historic shift in emphasis from Cherokee 
Indian to Cherokee Indian, that is, from cultural logic to bio-logic:
And the defendant further says, that, from the time he re-
moved, as aforesaid, he incorporated himself with the said 
tribe of Indians as one of them, and was and is so treated, rec-
ognized, and adopted by said tribe and the proper authorities 
thereof, and exercised and exercises all the rights and privileges 
of a Cherokee Indian in said tribe, and was and is domiciled 
in the country aforesaid; that, before______ and at the time of 
the commission of the supposed crime, if any such was com-
mitted, to wit, in the Indian country aforesaid, he, the defen-
dant, by the acts aforesaid, became, and was, and still is, a citi-
zen of the Cherokee nation, and became, and was, and still is, 
a Cherokee Indian, within the true intent and meaning of the 
act of Congress in that behalf provided. (568)
The syntax of the plea suggests that to be a “citizen of the Cherokee 
nation,” which is to “exercise . . . all the rights and privileges” thereof, 
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is to be a Cherokee Indian. On the one hand, we can say that Cherokee 
thinking incorporates a biological term of race, “Indian” (coined by 
Columbus and acquiring its biological meaning in the nineteenth-
 century discourses of law and anthropology), into a cultural-political 
term, “Cherokee,” representing a particular post-invasion national for-
mation that took shape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
response to Anglo-American imperialism. The anthropologist James 
Mooney notes: “Cherokee, the name by which they are commonly 
known, has no meaning in their own language, and seems to be of for-
eign origin” (15). Following Mooney’s work, we might speculate that 
before any national names took hold, clan and town names were the 
principal names of self-ascription for the peoples known now as the 
Cherokee. 
On the other hand, in contradistinction to the incorporation of bio-
logic by cultural logic, Cherokee Indian can represent the invasion and 
displacement of cultural by bio-logic, as Chief Justice Taney suggests in 
his decision:
And we think it very clear, that a white man who at mature 
age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an 
Indian, and was not intended to be embraced in the excep-
tion [to the 1834 trade and intercourse act, which exempted 
Indian-on-Indian crime from federal jurisdiction] above men-
tioned. He may by such adoption become entitled to certain 
privileges in the tribe, and make himself amenable to their laws 
and usages. Yet he is not an Indian; and the exception is con-
fi ned to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians 
are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of 
members of a tribe, but of the race generally, of the family 
of Indians; and it intended to leave them both [Rogers and 
Nicholson presumably], as regarded their own tribe, and other 
tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs. (45 
U.S. at 572–73)
The preceding passage suggests that for Taney the issue is not wheth-
er or not Rogers and Nicholson are Cherokee Indians but whether or 
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not they are Indians. The former designation would mean simply that 
they are “members of a [particular] tribe,” which Taney seems willing to 
concede; the latter designation, however, means not inclusion in a tribe 
but “in the race generally, of the family of Indians.” Taney’s decision, 
in other words, gives us the generic “Indian,” invented by Columbus 
and here refurbished in the language of bio-logic. By 1850, four years 
after the Court’s decision in Rogers, “[f ]ormal racial classifi cation . . . 
[became] operative on the census . . . and it was then left to white census 
enumerators to decide whether or not to accept the classifi cation offered 
by those who were counted” (Krupat 78). 
Yet the passage also implies that Taney’s bio-logical Indian is still op-
erating under cultural logic, suggesting that we are witnessing here is the 
historical moment when the bio-logical Indian was still emerging from 
the cultural logic of local community, or tribal, logic. Note, for example, 
that Taney’s implicit bio-logical formulation—a white man cannot be 
an Indian—is contained within a cultural parameter: “a white man who 
at a mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become 
an Indian” suggests that white youths and white females can become 
Indians through the cultural logic of adoption. This apparently strange 
proviso may be prompted by the anxiety expressed in the opinion that 
the Indian tribes will become a refuge for adult white male criminals 
seeking to escape U.S. jurisdiction (45 U.S. at 573). Whatever its cause, 
its effect is to circumscribe a certain bio-logic by a certain cultural logic. 
Further, the defi nition of “Indian” that the opinion offers “is confi ned 
to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as 
belonging to their race.” Thus, it would appear, the emergent bio- logical 
category of Indians-as-a-race is determined by “the usages and customs 
of the Indians” themselves. The logic here seems circular: the race of 
Indians will determine who is an Indian, but the universal situation 
it invokes, being entirely abstract (there are in fact no generic Indians 
beyond various jargons, both legal and scientifi c, only members of par-
ticular communities: clans, tribes, and nations), returns us to the local 
situation (Rogers is a Cherokee), which Taney’s opinion, accepted unani-
mously by the Court, is trying to transcend with its incipient bio-logic. 
Prior to Rogers, Indian communities under certain circumstances adopt-
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ed Europeans, whether or not these communities referred to themselves 
as “tribes” or “nations” or with clan or kinship terms. But, it should be 
emphasized, adoption by the community did not make an “Indian,” a 
Western racial/political category, but a community member, a person 
belonging to a Native cultural category.
The bio-logic beginning to emerge in Rogers would not reach its full 
force in federal Indian affairs until the early twentieth century, when it 
would become a distinct component, fi rst, of government determina-
tions of degrees of “Indianness” and, after 1934, of tribal determina-
tions of their own enrollments as well. In the former case, the bio-logic 
of blood had its fi rst major impact in 1906 through policy that stemmed 
from amendments to the 1887 Dawes, or General Allotment Act. 
The ostensible rationale for allotment was “progressive,” the assimila-
tion of the Indians into the American dream of property- holding individ-
ualism. At fi rst allottees “born within the territorial limits of the United 
States” were automatically granted citizenship by the act (Prucha, no. 
104, sec.6), which in its original form placed their land “in trust” with 
the U.S. government “for the period of twenty-fi ve years . . . for the sole 
use and benefi t of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been 
made,” at the end of which time the allotment was delivered in fee to the 
allottee (Prucha, no 104, sec 5). The citizenship provision was amended 
by the Burke Act of 1906, by which “the Indian became a citizen after 
the patent in fee simple was granted instead of upon the completion of 
his allotment and the issuance of a trust patent” (Cohen 154). 
Among policies implemented in the wake of the Burke Act were au-
thorizations for “competency commissions” to determine whether the 
newly compelled individual Indians should receive the patent to their 
land in fee or in trust. Government policy often, though not uniform-
ly,2 deemed the individual “competent” if he or she were of one-half or 
less Indian blood (Getches 174; Cohen 169). Just how autonomous the 
bio-logic of blood had become since its emergence in federal Indian 
discourses in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century can be read in fed-
eral Indian discourses of the fi rst quarter of the twentieth century. For 
example, United States v. Shock (187 Fed. 862 [1911]) fi nds: “The vary-
ing degrees of blood most naturally become the lines of demarcation 
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between the different classes, because experience shows that generally 
speaking the greater percentage of Indian blood a given allottee has, the 
less capable he is by natural qualifi cation and experience to manage his 
property” (Cohen 169). Similarly the Annual Report of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1917 states: “While ethnologically a preponderance 
of white blood has not heretofore been a criterion of competency, nor 
even now is it always a safe standard, it is almost an axiom that an Indian 
who has a larger proportion of white blood than Indian partakes more 
of the characteristics of the former than of the latter” (qtd in Cohen 
169). Pronouncements like these reveal the cultural logic of identity for-
mation through the social act of intermarriage being translated into the 
bio-logic of blood; we can read, that is, the naturalization, or biologiza-
tion, of the social construction of race.
From the time of U.S. v. Rogers to the present moment, the bio-logic 
of Indian identity politics has achieved increasing autonomy, which has 
generated a new confi guration of racism. Between the institution of the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934, which ended allotment, and 
1940, the BIA began to issue Certifi cates of Degree of Indian Blood 
(CDIB), though without any written regulations for such issuance. 
Written rules were fi rst proposed in 1986 and a draft was composed in 
1992. The proposed rules were fi nally published in the Federal Register 
in 2000 (65 FR 20775) and, as of this writing, as far as I know, are still 
currently under consideration by the BIA.3 The following is language 
taken from the proposal:
A Certifi cate of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native Blood 
(CDIB) certifi es that an individual possesses a specifi c degree 
of Indian blood of a federally recognized Indian tribe(s). A de-
ciding Bureau [BIA] offi cial issues the CDIB. We issue CDIBs 
so that individuals may establish their eligibility for those pro-
grams and services based upon their status as American Indians 
and/or Alaska Natives. A CDIB does not establish membership 
in a federally recognized Indian tribe, and does not prevent an 
Indian tribe from making a separate and independent deter-
mination of blood degree for tribal purposes. . . . The rolls of 
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federally recognized Indian tribes may be used as the basis for 
issuing CDIBs. The base rolls of some tribes are deemed to be 
correct by statute, even if errors exist. . . . All portions of the 
Request for Certifi cate of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native 
Blood (CDIB) must be completed. You must show your re-
lationship to an enrolled member(s) of a federally recognized 
Indian tribe, whether it is through your birth mother or birth 
father, or both. (65 FR at 20776, 20778)
The bureaucratic language of Indian identity in the year 2000 is mark-
edly different from that of the explicit language of naturalized racial 
hierarchies, which rationalized competency commissions in the Dawes 
era. We immediately recognize the latter, with its claims of innate white 
superiority, as racist, while the language of identity in the federal regula-
tions proposed for the issuance of a CDIB appears in the bureaucratic 
rhetoric of neutrality. But in both cases the same colonial bureaucracy, 
albeit at different historical moments, dictates the legitimate forms of 
Indian identity for the purpose of resource distribution. Whereas the 
language of the Dawes era expresses unselfconsciously the racial ideol-
ogy that rationalizes the maldistribution of resources inherent in the 
colonial system of Indian country, the language of identity in the era of 
Indian “Self Determination” (the typical title for the post-1970 phase of 
U.S. colonialism in Indian country) represses or disavows this ideology 
both in the very form of its expression (the “value-free” language of bu-
reaucracy) and in the source of its promulgation: the contemporary BIA 
staffed by “about 87 per cent” Indians, including the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs and “[m]ost of the high level Indian policy positions 
within the Interior Department” (Getches 239). An Indian-run BIA 
is the result of a provision in the IRA, which dictates Indian prefer-
ence in hiring within the agency. This policy was challenged in 1972 
by a group of white workers in the BIA, who claimed it violated the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial 
discrimination in hiring. But the practice was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in a 1974 decision that found: “The preference, as applied, is 
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as mem-
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bers of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are gov-
erned by the BIA in a unique fashion” (Morton v. Mancari at 554). In 
this case, it appears, the Court used cultural logic to trump bio-logic. 
Yet, the regulation in the BIA manual, dictating the hiring preference, 
and cited in the opinion, was itself contingent on the bio-logic of blood: 
“To be eligible for preference in appointment, promotion, and training, 
an individual must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a 
member of a Federally-recognized tribe” (554).4
Contemporary regulations of blood, couched in a vocabulary that 
promises scientifi c objectivity and generated by an Indian-run bureau-
cracy, give the bio-logic of blood quantum legitimacy at a moment in 
which we are witnessing the biologization of a whole range of cultur-
al logics organized around a naturalization and universalization of “the 
body” both as a material object of knowledge and as a metaphor for 
“human nature.” 
Even given the offi cial respectability (both federal and tribal) of blood 
quantum regulations at the present moment, the language of the BIA 
on CDIBs suggests that the bio-logic of blood quantum cannot escape 
its ground in the cultural logic of the political history from which it 
emerges. For this language suggests the relative non-identity of federally 
identifi ed and tribally identifi ed Indians: “A CDIB does not establish 
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe, and does not prevent 
an Indian tribe from making a separate and independent determination of 
blood degree for tribal purposes” (my emphasis). The Rights of Indians and 
Tribes puts it succinctly: “Indian tribes have the authority to determine 
who is an Indian for tribal purposes but not for state or federal purpos-
es” (Pevar 19) That is, there is no stable answer to the scandalous ques-
tion that frames the U.S. legal history of Native identity from Rogers 
forward: What or who is an Indian? In 1979, in its opinion in the case 
of U.S. v. Broncheau, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit pointed to the legal instability of Indian identity: “Unlike the 
term ‘Indian Country,’ which has been defi ned in 18 U.S.C.§1151, the 
term ‘Indian’ has not been statutorily defi ned but instead has been judi-
cially explicated over the years. The test, fi rst suggested in United States 
v. Rogers and generally followed by the courts, considers (1) the degree 
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of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian” 
(597 F.2d at 1263; internal references omitted).5 What Broncheau points 
to is not only the legal instability of the term Indian, which changes its 
shape from ruling to ruling, from federal to tribal regulations, but also 
the way federal Indian law has rationalized the historical ambiguities 
of bio- and cultural logic found in Rogers into the apparent clarity of a 
two-pronged identity standard, of which, ironically, Rogers becomes the 
ground. However, the cultural prong of the standard is itself grounded 
in the bio-logical prong. For tribal membership, as noted, is itself widely 
dependent on some degree of Indian blood.
The question, “What is an Indian?,” formulated as such in the 
wake of Rogers and the Dawes Act, appears offi cially, perhaps for the 
fi rst time as such, in the Sixty-First Annual Report of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1892: “In close connection with the subject of 
Government control over the Indians and methods of administration, 
an interesting question has recently arisen, What is an Indian?” (31). 
Fifty years later, referring to historic shifts in the legal articulation of 
the term “Indian,” Felix Cohen’s classic Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law (1942) begins by noting “[t]he lack of unanimity which exists 
among those who would attempt a defi nition of Indians” (2). “Who is 
an Indian?” is the fi rst question under the heading “Frequently Asked 
Questions” on the BIA web site, which was closed by court order in 
December of 2001;6 and its answer is useful not so much for the infor-
mation it gives, which in view of the legal history of Indian identity is 
necessarily problematic, but for the way it condenses and displaces the 
colonial history it represents:
No single Federal or tribal criterion establishes a person’s iden-
tity as an Indian. Government agencies use differing criteria to 
determine who is an Indian eligible to participate in their pro-
grams. Tribes also have varying eligibility criteria for member-
ship. To determine what the criteria might be for agencies or 
Tribes, you must contact each entity directly. 
To be eligible for Bureau of Indian Affairs services, an Indian 
must (1) be a member of a Tribe recognized by the Federal 
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Government, (2) [be] one-half or more Indian blood of tribes 
indigenous to the United States (25 USC 479); or (3) must, for 
some purposes, be of one-fourth or more Indian ancestry:
The Bureau of the Census counts anyone an Indian who de-
clares himself or herself to be an Indian. In 1990 the Census fi g-
ures showed there were 1,959,234 American Indians and Alaska 
Natives living in the United States (1,878,285 American Indians, 
57,152 Eskimos, and 23,797 Aleuts). This is a 37.9 percent in-
crease over the 1980 recorded total of 1,420,000. The increase 
is attributed to improved census taking and more self-identifi ca-
tion during the 1990 count. (Bureau of Indian Affairs)
The bureau’s deceptively simple answer raises questions that suggest 
the way that Indian identity is bureaucratized, composed of legal and 
administrative contradictions or ambiguities and thus dispersed or de-
ferred until tribunals of various kinds (courts, administrative panels, 
tribal councils) can come to decisions, which are at best only provi-
sional. For example, in answering the crucial question of eligibility for 
services implied in “Who is an Indian?”, the BIA lists three criteria (with 
the third being a modifi cation of the second), as cited above: “(1). . . a 
member of a Tribe recognized by the Federal Government, (2) one-half 
or more Indian blood of tribes indigenous to the United States (25 USC 
479); or (3). . . for some purposes . . . of one-fourth or more Indian an-
cestry.” This language is a modifi cation of the answer previously given 
by the Bureau to the same question in the third edition (1991) of the 
pamphlet American Indians Today: Answers to Your Questions: “To be el-
igible for Bureau of Indian Affairs services, an Indian must (1) be a 
member of a tribe recognized by the federal government and (2) must, 
for some purposes, be of one-fourth or more Indian ancestry” (13). 
The addition of one-half blood quantum to the more recent rule cites 
as its authority section 479 of the 25th title of the U.S. Code, which 
in fact is the codifi cation of section 19 of the IRA. Why, then, has the 
bureau only recently added this proviso to its defi nition of Indian ? 
Section 479 of title 25 gives a defi nition of “[t]he term ‘Indian’” limited 
by the phrase “as used in this Act” (my emphasis). Thus, the BIA appears 
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to be taking the defi nition of Indian out of context in order to generalize 
it. After limiting its defi nition to specifi c sections of the code, section 479 
defi nes Indians as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any 
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons 
who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, resid-
ing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall 
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood”(my 
emphasis). Whereas the latest available BIA defi nition of Indian speci-
fi es tribal membership and one-half blood quantum, except in certain 
circumstances where one-quarter will suffi ce, section 479 appears to say 
that a person is an Indian if she or he is either a tribal member or is de-
scended from a tribal member and had reservation residency status on 
June 1, 1934 or is “of one-half or more Indian blood.” The qualifying 
phrase “all persons of Indian descent” seems redundant on the one hand; 
but on the other, if taken at face value, raises troublesome questions, no 
doubt unintentionally, about how one determines such descent outside 
of the defi nitional boundaries of tribal enrollment and/or blood quan-
tum. That is, how is “Indian descent” determined in the fi rst instance?
Thus, the highly restrictive current BIA defi nition, which combines a 
high blood quantum with tribal membership, cites as its authority a more 
inclusive, if still restrictive, defi nition, in which one-half blood quantum 
is an alternative to either tribal membership or conditional descent from a 
tribal member. Whether the BIA’s citation of the IRA out of context is le-
gitimate rests on individual challenges to the administrative rules govern-
ing Indian identity. But, in elaborating a history of the continual federal 
amending of Indian identity from U.S. v. Rogers to the present, I want 
to emphasize the kind of structural contradictions to which I have been 
pointing. These result in the fundamental incoherence of Indian identity 
based in the colonial system of federal Indian law, an incoherence found-
ed on an historical proliferation of laws, legal cases, and regulations that 
cannot possibly be comprehended in any systematic way. 
II.
From its beginnings in the 1970s the criticism of Native American lit-
eratures has made the question what is an Indian? central to its project. 
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The problem is that this criticism does not recognize the political his-
tory of this question, which Rogers and its progeny represent. In the fi rst 
book-length study of the American Indian novel, published in 1978, 
Charles R. Larson begins by noting: “The concept of Indian identity 
. . . is a diffi cult one” (2). And after musing on the blood quantum and 
phenotype of several Native authors including N. Scott Momaday and 
John Joseph Matthews (both now securely in the Native American liter-
ary canon), Larson asks: “In short, how can we determine that the writ-
ers discussed in this study are American Indians? How can we be certain, 
even, that they wrote the works attributed to them? I ask these questions 
because the two primary qualifi cations for inclusion of an author in this 
study are, fi rst, the establishment that he or she is genuinely a Native 
American, and, second, that he wrote the novel himself without the aid 
of a collaborator or an amanuensis” (4). 
Larson is clearly preoccupied with who is “genuinely Native American” 
without at the same time being able to supply a precise defi nition of 
“genuine.” Larson’s rejection of fi ction written in collaboration with a 
non-Indian appears to be based on a desire not to dilute or compro-
mise the “‘Indianness’”(2) of the works he includes. Thus, he margin-
alizes what is now considered to be a major Indian novel, indeed the 
fi rst major Indian novel published in the twentieth century and I would 
argue the fi rst major Indian novel published,7 Cogewea, The Half-Blood 
(1927) by Mourning Dove, because she collaborated with Lucullus 
Virgil McWhorter (5). As for his working defi nition of “Indianness” in 
the fi rst place, Larson turns to the tribal rolls: 
The inclusion of a writer’s name on the rolls of his specifi c tribe 
(compiled by tribal leaders and kept in the tribal headquarters 
as well as in the Bureau of Indian Affairs) implies a kind of kin-
ship with his fellow tribesman. . . . What is of especial interest 
for my study here is the “degree” of Indian blood suggested by 
the tribal rolls. . . . my concern with these [enrollment] fi gures 
has only been to suggest that although a signifi cant test of a writ-
er’s Indian origins falls back on the rolls themselves, compiled 
by the tribal councils, the “Indianness” of the writing may have 
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little to do with these fi gures. . . . Known acceptance by one’s 
peers, then, is probably a more meaningful test of Indianness. 
Along these lines, it should be pointed out that many of the 
writers discussed in this volume have had their work included 
in anthologies of American Indian writing, edited by American 
Indians—a further test of this acceptance. (6–8)
Such community-centered criteria are certainly used today to de-
termine the “Indianness” of Indian writing. But Larson’s presentation 
of them is circular: how do those Indians who edit Indian anthologies 
come to be recognized as Indians themselves, if not by the identical 
processes (tribal enrollment and/or appearance in Indian anthologies) 
Larson is using to establish his notion of “Indianness” in the fi rst place. 
Hence, the way he presents his criteria does not answer the question who 
is an Indian but begs it in an endless regress because he fails to query the 
politics of the question itself. That is, he invokes the tribal rolls initially 
but does not historicize them by connecting them to the colonial history 
of federal Indian law from which they arose. Outside the legal fence that 
Rogers and its progeny, as practical applications of the European imagi-
nary, have constructed around Native identities by homogenizing them 
as Indian identity, we might imagine that there are no Indian writers, 
only Cherokee or Navajo or Lakota writers and even more locally de-
fi ned, only writers with particular clan/kinship names to identify them. 
Such identities, which certainly depend on community recognition, 
nevertheless conform not to a single bio-logic but to multiple cultural 
logics, the kind that obtained in Native communities, and still persist 
in important ways (however “unoffi cially”) before the onset of federal 
Indian law, what Gerald Vizenor terms “word wars of the whiteman” 
(Bearheart 14). Within these “word wars,” which generate the history 
of the question Who or what is an Indian?, the question itself is noth-
ing but a scandal of European colonialism. At the same time, however, 
it is crucial to emphasize that across Native communities, particularly in 
the twentieth century, the term “Indian” has been adopted not simply 
out of necessity but as a sign of both personal pride and trans-tribal or-
ganization to deal in various ways with federal policy, as noted in the 
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titles of such organizations, past and present, as the Society of America 
Indians (SAI), the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and 
the American Indian Movement (AIM).
Nevertheless, to repeat the question without emphasizing its politi-
cal history perpetuates the scandal by naturalizing it. Fifteen years after 
Larson raises the question in the literary realm, Louis Owens begins his 
infl uential study of the American Indian novel Other Destinies (1992) 
with the same question: “To begin to write about something called ‘the 
American Indian novel’ is to enter a slippery and uncertain terrain. Take 
one step into this region and we are confronted with diffi cult questions 
of authority and ethnicity: What is an Indian?” (3). For Owens the cen-
tral theme of the contemporary American Indian novel is the “question 
of identity” (5): “For the contemporary Indian novelist—in every case a 
mixedblood who must come to terms in one form or another with pe-
ripherality as well as both European and Indian ethnicity—identity is 
the central issue and theme. . .” (5). 
Informed by both postmodern and postcolonial studies, Owens 
quotes Vizenor to the effect that all “Indians” are “invented”; and he 
pointedly notes: “For American Indians, the problem of identity com-
prehends centuries of colonial and postcolonial displacement. . .” (4). 
But while he remarks that in addition to “some basic knowledge of 
the tribal histories and mythologies of the Indian cultures at the heart 
of these novels, readers should be aware of crucial moments in Native 
American history of the last two centuries [because] [s]uch moments 
fi gure prominently in writing by Indian authors” (30), Owens devotes 
only the last two pages of this thirty-one page introduction to those 
moments in the history of federal Indian law, and then, he confl ates 
two key cases in this history, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and 
Worcester v. Georgia (1832). Thus, while pointing toward the impor-
tance of colonial history in understanding American Indian literatures, 
Owens does not specify the historic legal forces that give crucial defi -
nition to the notion of “invented Indians,” charging the phrase with 
its particular colonial valence; nor does he query the cultural and bio-
logics that both confl ict in and construct the term “mixedblood.” The 
history of these logics makes Owens’ assertion that “every” contempo-
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rary Indian novelist is a “mixedblood” problematic. For, depending on 
the context, a mixedblood might be a fullblood and vice versa. In the 
Cherokee Keetoowah society—“a secret religious organization that had 
been revived and strengthened between 1858–59” (Sturm 71)—Circe 
Sturm gives us an example of such a context:
Though the Keetoowah Society was open to Christian 
Cherokees, it did not admit members of mixed racial ancestry, 
and even educated full-bloods were suspect. . . . Keetoowah 
meetings were conducted in Cherokee and the proceedings re-
corded in the syllabary, which provided a modicum of protec-
tion from curious outsiders. However, this “anti-mixed blood 
sentiment among Keetoowahs was strange, because several im-
portant leaders had mixed racial ancestry. . . . The categories of 
full and mixed were much more complex than mixed biological 
parentage. . .”. Again, we see how full-blood and mixed-blood 
were social, cultural, and political constructs. “Politically speak-
ing, the terms served as shorthand. Mixed stood for accommo-
dation with whites, a willingness to negotiate. Full bloods were 
uncompromising and religiously insistent. . .” (72; internal ref-
erences omitted)
Owens’s ahistorical, or under-theorized, use of the term mixedblood 
allows him to stabilize it by assuming the word’s transparency and thus 
to make the claim that “the dominant theme in novels by Indian au-
thors [is] the dilemma of the mixedblood, the liminal ‘breed’ seeming-
ly trapped between Indian and white worlds”(40). In Cherokee novel-
ist Thomas King’s postmodern trickster narrative Green Grass, Running 
Water, one of the Indian characters catches the schematic banality of the 
mixedblood theme: 
It was a common enough theme in novels and movies. Indian 
leaves the traditional world of the reserve, goes to the city, and 
is destroyed. Indian leaves the traditional world of the reserve, 
is exposed to white culture, and becomes trapped between two 
worlds. Indian leaves the traditional world of the reserve, gets 
an education, and is shunned by his tribe. (317)
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As King’s character points out the mixedblood between two worlds has 
been a standard trope in the literary history of twentieth-century Native 
writing; though the passage cited locates the trope in cultural texts per 
se, while I want to locate it in standard interpretations of those texts. 
The project of Other Destinies is to revive this exhausted topos by ring-
ing some changes on it. In this vein, Owens remarks of “Leslie Silko, in 
Ceremony (1977), [that she] writes again of a mixedblood protagonist 
lost between cultures and identities. In the character of Tayo, however, 
Silko turns the conventionally painful predicament of the mixedblood 
around, making the mixedblood a metaphor for the dynamic, syncret-
ic, adaptive qualities of Indian cultures that will ensure survival” (26). 
And of Vizenor, Owens comments that he “rejects entirely the conven-
tional posture of mourning for the hapless mixedblood trapped between 
worlds, identifying the mixedblood with the shape-shifting visage of 
trickster, who requires that we reexamine, moment by moment, all defi -
nition and discourse” (27). These remarks usefully complicate the fi gure 
of the mixedblood within a literary tradition where the fi gure always 
teeters on and often falls over the brink of sentimentality. But once we 
place the term “mixedblood” back within the colonial history of cultural 
and bio-logic, then, I think, the “two-worlds” paradigm with the mixed-
blood as mediating term requires revision as an interpretive model, pre-
cisely because the terms “mixedblood” and “fullblood” are not dialec-
tical opposites but ambiguous, overlapping signs, overdetermined by 
their simultaneous positions in a range of contexts (legal, social, cul-
tural, Native, and non-Native). 
For example, who says Tayo is a mixedblood? Certainly, the narrative 
informs us that his mother is Laguna and his father, a nameless white 
man. But in a world of intermarriage, Tayo is hardly alone or anomalous 
as a representative fi gure, however solitary in certain ways he may be be-
cause of the alienation of his war experience. As his aunt remarks: “Girls 
around here have babies by white men all the time now, and nobody 
says anything. Men run around with Mexicans and even worse, and 
nothing is ever said” (33). The Laguna Constitution, as ratifi ed in 1958, 
makes tribal membership contingent on having two tribally-enrolled 
parents and some degree of Indian blood, unless one is at least a half-
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blood Indian (born before 1958 with one enrolled parent) or half-blood 
Laguna (born in wedlock with one enrolled parent). In making tribal 
membership very fl exible (in terms of blood quantum) for the children 
of two Laguna parents, the rule suggests the Pueblo’s desire to try to limit 
a reasonably widespread practice of intermarriage, even as it is prepared 
to admit the children of intermarriage to tribal membership, though the 
gateway narrows considerably.8 Because Silko never makes it an issue 
in Ceremony, we can assume that Tayo is a tribally enrolled member of 
Laguna Pueblo; and a member of a clan, the latter because Laguna is 
a matrilineal society, clan membership being determined through the 
mother (Ortiz 443). So, in these terms, readers can assume Tayo is not a 
mixedblood; he is a Laguna Indian, not positioned between two worlds 
but ceremonially searching for his balance within Laguna society, after 
the trauma of World War II coupled with the colonialist thrust of his 
secondary school education, which denigrated Laguna epistemologies, 
has imbalanced him.
Within the novel, the fi rst reference to Tayo as a mixedblood comes 
from his aunt, who thinks of him as a “half-breed child” (30). But 
Auntie, it is clear, is the character in the novel who is the most alien-
ated from traditional Laguna practices. Silko stresses not only her 
Christianity, which “separated the people from themselves . . . tr[ying] 
to crush the single clan name” (68) but her upbringing of her son, 
Tayo’s cousin, Rocky, who, a fullblood in terms of bio-logic, is virtually 
a white man in terms of cultural logic. The only other character in the 
novel who uses the language of racism about Tayo, referring to him as 
“white trash” (63), is the violent Laguna veteran Emo, who has noth-
ing but contempt for anything Indian and a murderous envy of every-
thing white. Besides Auntie, the Laguna elders who fi gure importantly 
in Tayo’s life (his grand mother, his uncle Josiah, his uncle Robert, and 
the Laguna medicine man Ku’oosh) never refer to him in blood-quan-
tum terms but accept him matter of factly as a full-fl edged member of 
the community, who needs their help. Thus, Tayo is only a mixedblood 
from the most alienated of perspectives. As Owens along with others 
notices in Ceremony, Silko certainly is fascinated with mixture as a posi-
tive force—Josiah’s cattle are hybrid Hereford/Mexican and Betonie, the 
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Navajo chanter who provides the ceremony for Tayo’s cure is Navajo/
Mexican—but Silko never refers to these combinations in the language 
of blood quantum. So Betonie is not a mixedblood; the cattle are not 
mixedbloods; and Tayo is not a mixedblood, except in a bio-logical lan-
guage that Silko marks as alienated.
Owens’s insight, previously noted, that “Silko turns the conven-
tionally painful predicament of the mixedblood around, making the 
mixedblood a metaphor for the dynamic, syncretic, adaptive qualities 
of Indian cultures that will ensure survival” makes sense. But within 
the colonial history of federal Indian law it still leaves us asking in what 
sense or senses Owens uses “mixedblood.” For what the sentence says 
is that all Indians are mixedbloods or virtually so, insofar as mixed-
bloods are merely metaphors for the dynamism inherent in all Indian 
cultures. 
Owens, then, invokes the importance of history in interpreting 
American Indian writing; but in interpreting Silko’s Ceremony, he also 
bypasses its importance by situating the term “mixedblood” outside 
the colonial history of cultural and bio-logic, of appearance and behav-
ior, which gives Tayo’s “quest for identity” (20) its particular historical 
weight. Similarly in his reading of Vizenor’s Bearheart, Owens omits the 
fact that the narrative of Vizenor’s fi rst novel, published in 1978, a year 
after Ceremony, locates his mixedblood tricksters in a fl ight from the 
bureaucratic strictures of the BIA and its allied tribal councils created 
under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934: 
The women continued to govern the circus in the traditions 
of tribal families, the values of shared consciousness until the 
patriarchal whitemen rewarded the tribal men as chiefs and 
rulers. Meanwhile reservation governments were gaining new 
powers and new generations of evil politicians were seeking 
control of the sacred cedar. The Indian Reorganization Act cre-
ated constitutional governments on reservations. The constitu-
tions were designed by white anthropologists and the elections 
of tribal people were manipulated by colonial federal adminis-
trators. Men of evil and tribal fools were propped up in reser-
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vation offi ces to authorize the exploitation of native lands and 
natural resources. (12)
When Vizenor introduces the notion of “invented Indians” into the 
narrative, it is a response that emerges from the history of federal Indian 
law: “‘What does Indian mean?’” (195) asks a member of a vicious com-
munity of “hunters and breeders,” “‘proud people,’” who in the post-
apocalyptic world of Bearheart live in a walled community restricted to 
people of their “‘own breed’” (189), fullbloods, we might say, though ap-
parently non-Native fullbloods in this case. Ironically, the mixedblood 
answer is a paraphrase of the BIA regulations governing Indian identity: 
“An Indian is a member of a recognized tribe and a person who has 
Indian blood.” Doubling the irony, the immediate fullblood response is: 
“But what is Indian blood?” And the immediate mixedblood rejoinder 
is: “Indian blood is not white blood” (195; my emphasis). 
The force of this exchange is to deconstruct the very notion of blood 
by making it no more than the absence of its hypothetical opposite in a 
continually circular logic that will never yield a signifi ed. Thus, the logic 
of Bearheart insists that the terms of blood quantum have no meaning 
whatsoever outside the colonial discourses that enforce them. This in-
sistence results in the irony, intentional or not, produced by Vizenor’s 
substitution of the term “mixedblood” for the term “Indian.” For both 
terms are produced by the same legal discourse.
Notes
 1 For a history of these developments, see Stanton.
 2 For a discussion of the varying criteria for competency, see McDonnell, Chapter 
7; and Cohen 167–69.
 3 I arrived at this date from information supplied to me in a telephone conver-
sation with Karen Ketcher, Branch of Tribal Operations, Eastern Oklahoma 
region, department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 101 North 5th 
Street, Muskogee, OK 74401. “In reviewing the Bureau’s practices, the Interior 
Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) ruled that the degree of Indian blood of an in-
dividual Indian cannot be changed by the Bureau on the basis of ‘the evidentia-
ry standards set forth in unwritten policy statements’ and advised the Bureau to 
develop and issue regulations, Underwood v. Deputy Assistant Secretary—Indian 
Affairs, 93 I.D. 13, 14 IBIA 3, January 31, 1986. In the absence of regulations, 
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the Bureau has been without the authority to invalidate or amend CDIBs is-
sued in error. As a result, there are individuals who do not receive services for 
which they may qualify and individuals who receive services for which they 
do not qualify” (65 FR at 20776). For a history of the proposal see 65 FR at 
20776–78.
 4 Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 5.1 (25 CFRs 5.1) currently 
uses the criteria of 25 USC § 479, which does not require minimum blood 
quantum of any kind if one is tribally enrolled or descended from a specifi c 
category of tribal member, though, once again, we ought to remember that 
the tribal enrollment itself typically requires, among other criteria, a certain 
blood quantum. The ACLU’s handbook, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, notes: 
“Many tribes require that a person have at least one-fourth tribal blood to be 
enrolled” (Pevar 19).
 5 In fact the Wheeler-Howard Act does defi ne “Indian” for its purposes (25 USC 
479) and so the Court in Broncheau is strictly speaking wrong when it says that 
“the term ‘Indian’ has not been statutorily defi ned.” But the defi nition refers to 
the use of the term in the Act alone and so appears to be contextually limited, 
that is, not generally applicable, though the BIA, as I discuss below, has never-
theless tried to generalize from the Act.
 6 These questions were accessible on the BIA website <http://www.doi.gov/ 
 bureau-indian-affairs.html> before Federal Judge Royce Lambert ordered the site 
closed in December of 2001 in relation to the Indian trust fund litigation, pend-
ing assurances that trust fund accounts were not vulnerable to hacking through 
the site. These criteria for “Who is an Indian?” can currently be found at <http://
lycos.factmonster.com/ipka/A0192524.html>. On request the BIA sent me in 
November of 2003 a pamphlet titled American Indians and Alaska Natives, which 
contains “Answers to Some Frequently Asked questions.” Among these is “Who 
is an American Indian or Alaska Native?” The answer is: “As a general principle 
an Indian is a person who is of some degree Indian blood and is recognized as 
an Indian tribe and/or the United States. No single federal or tribal criterion 
establishes a person’s identity as an Indian. Government agencies use differing 
criteria to determine eligibility for different programs and services. Tribes also 
have varying eligibility criteria for membership” (“Who is an Indian?”).
   It is important to understand the difference between the etymological term 
“Indian” and the political/legal term “Indian.” The protections and services pro-
vided by the United States for tribal members fl ow not from an individual’s 
status as an American Indian in an ethnological sense, but because the person is 
a member of a tribe recognized by the United States, and with which the United 
States has a special trust relationship. This special trust relationship entails cer-
tain legally enforceable obligations and responsibilities.
   There is nothing in this pamphlet about criteria for eligibility for BIA services; 
and the pamphlet does not defi ne “ethnological.” But as we will see in the fol-
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lowing discussion, section 479 of the 25th title of the US code suggests that one 
does not have to be a tribally enrolled Indian to be recognized as an Indian by 
the federal government if once can prove that one’s blood quantum is one-half 
or more. And the above citation as well points to “some degree of Indian blood” 
and federal recognition is as suffi cient, independent of tribal recognition, to es-
tablish one’s legal status as an Indian. In any event, this BIA publication is only 
one more piece of evidence in the case that can be made for the utter incoher-
encey of the way federal Indian law had historically defi ned Indian identity.
 7 The Cherokee writer John Rollin Ridge published his novel The Life and 
Adventures of Joaquin Murieta the Celebrated California Bandit in 1854. But the 
book, as the title suggests, in not about Indians, but about Mexicans fi ghting for 
their land in Anglo-occupied California. In his study of the U.S. Native novel 
Other Destinies, Louis Owens reads Ridge’s championing of Mexican resistance 
to U.S. land theft as a displacement of the novelist’s criticism of the U.S. theft 
of Native lands, while noting that the brief portraits of California Indians in the 
novel are scurrilously stereotypical. Owens fi nds this simultaneous embrace of 
Mexican/Indian land rights and “racist” view of California Indians “paradoxical” 
(39). I fi nd, on the other hand, that Ridge’s racist portraits of the only literal 
Indians in the novels make it diffi cult to read the novel as an indirect defense 
of Native land rights. Ridge himself, born in 1827, was the son of one of the 
leaders of the Treaty Party, which in the 1830s supported removal and signed the 
infamous Treaty of New Echota (1835). This treaty violated the will of the ma-
jority of the Cherokees against removal, as expressed in the elected government 
of John Ross, and in the Cherokee Constitution, which, as noted, forbid sales of 
Cherokee land by persons acting without the authority of the Cherokee coun-
cil. In 1839, after their arrival in what would become the state of Oklahoma, 
the leaders of the Treaty Party, including Ridge’s father, grandfather, and cousin 
(Elias Boudinot) were assassinated for their subversion of the Cherokee polity. 
After the assassinations, Ridge and his mother left Oklahoma for Fayetteville, 
Arkansas. In 1850, after killing David Kell, a Cherokee whom he suspected of 
being one of his father’s assassins, Ridge left for California (Hoxie 550–52). S. 
Alice Callahan’s novel Wynema (1891), the fi rst novel we know to have been 
published by a U.S. American Indian woman, remains to be critically assessed, 
though A. Lavonne Brown Ruoff ’s introduction to her University of Nebraska 
Press edition marks an important beginning to this process.
 8 The Laguna Constitution, with membership requirements, as ratifi ed in 1958 
can be found at <http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/1958nmpuebcon.html>. While 
Tayo was born in a fi ctional time which lies outside the purview of the Laguna 
Constitution (the time of the novel is immediately following WWII, presumably 
placing Tayo’s birth date somewhere in the 1920s), he would appear to be a half-
blood Indian with an enrolled mother, which would afford him membership in 
the tribe if the Constitution was applicable.
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